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5.1 Define a long-term strategy 
for the electricity sector 
and establish an independent 
and powerful regulator
Chinese context - China has formulated explicit targets for the short-term future of its electric power 
system in its 12th Five-Year Plan for Energy 
Development. However, there are no official 
goals for the period after 2015. Also, there 
is as yet no comprehensive vision of China’s 
smart grid, especially with regard to distribu-
tion grids and the period after 2020. - The governance structure of China’s energy system regulation comprises a broad variety 
of ministries and institutions. The multiplicity 
of these stakeholders as well as the frequent 
reorganizations that have been taking 
place lead to difficulties in coordination and 
increased overlap of competences between 
the various government institutions involved 
in the power system regulation.- China’s earlier regulatory authority, the State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC), was 
merged with the National Energy Administra-
tion (NEA) in 2013. The National Development 
and Reform Commission (NDRC) and NEA are 
currently the responsible regulatory institu-
tions for the electricity sector. Both share 
regulatory responsibilities and are subject to 
political and industrial influence.
5.1.1 Background
Smart grids require strong government leader-
ship Smart grids are not an objective in its own 
right, but a new approach to meet the challenges 
that will arise with future electricity systems, for 
instance with an increasing share of renewable 
energies. Specifically, smart grids aim at achieving 
economic efficiency by combining the strengths of 
conventional grids with the new capabilities of ICT. 
In Germany, ICT requirements in electricity grids 
are driven mainly by intermittent supply from RES. 
Without RES, the conventional grid infrastructure 
would be sufficient to maintain high reliability levels 
in Germany’s electric power system. 
The evolution towards smart grids necessitates 
strong vision and leadership on the part of the 
government, because smart grids are not a market-
driven concept:- A clearly defined long-term strategy for the electric power sector reduces uncertainty for 
smart grid investors and manufacturers. A 
lower level of uncertainty on future develop-
ments reduces the risks with respect to the 
investment’s future cash flows. As such, smart 
grid investors and manufacturers are more 
willing to invest in smart grid technologies. A 
long-term strategy includes government tar-
gets with regard to the development of electric-
ity generation capacities of different technolo-
gies (the so-called generation mix) and targets 
for energy efficiency.- Clearly defined roles and responsibilities of government bodies are a fundamental require-
ment for the development of smart grids. 
Especially, a clear delineation between the 
competences of the ministries and the regula-
tor, and possibly other supervisory bodies is 
associated with a high degree of credibility and 
assertiveness of government policy. - An independent and powerful regulator func-tions as a coordinating institution between 
all market participants (incumbents and new 
market entrants). The coordination specifi-
cally focuses on the development of equal 
and non-discriminatory conditions of market 
entry where all market parties are treated 
equally and market power of single market 
actors is limited. The regulator should be 
sufficiently powerful to impose the measures 
necessary to manage the development of the 
electricity sector and the development of 
smart grids.
Characteristics of an independent regulator There 
are two aspects to a regulator’s independence: - independence from the regulated industry and- independence from politics.
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It is important for the regulator to be independent 
from the industry that is being regulated. If inde-
pendence is not guaranteed, the danger of so-called 
regulatory capture (i. e. the regulator rather favors 
commercial and industrial interests instead of pub-
lic interests) is high [1]. On the other hand, a regu-
lator needs to cooperate closely with the industry. 
Therefore, a relation of mutual trust is important. In 
some cases, the regulatory office is actually financed 
by the regulated industry. Note that this is not nec-
essarily a contradiction to the requirement of in-
dependence. Following the rules set by the govern-
ment, the firms are actually obliged to finance the 
work of the regulator on the basis of a pre-defined 
payment plan which is not based on a firm’s satisfac-
tion with the regulator’s work. The risk of regulatory 
capture is therefore small. 
The independence of the regulator from the 
regulated industry can be ensured in several ways:- The processes, decisions, and procedures of the regulator have to be transparent so that they 
can be controlled.- The regulator should make use of public consultations in which not only the regulated 
industry but also other stakeholders or the 
general public can express their views. Again, 
this avoids opaque agreements between the 
regulator and regulated industries.- The regulator should be monitored at regular intervals and should have to justify its work, 
for example, in an annual report.- Personal financial interests between the regulator and the regulated industry must be 
avoided. Two rules are specifically important 
in this context: first, senior regulator manage-
ment should not be allowed to have financial 
stakes in the regulated industry. Second, a 
moratorium period during which senior regu-
lator management cannot accept a job in the 
regulated industry is very useful.
Why the regulator should be independent from 
politics or from the ministry is a less straightfor-
ward question. Ultimately, the regulator is a govern-
ment institution that is governed by the ministry. 
The relevant concern is the precise legal delineation 
of authority: who decides on what? In the follow-
ing, four main arguments for independence of the 
regulator are listed: - Following the classical pattern of the separa-tion of powers, the legislator, the body that 
sets the rules, needs to be separated from the 
regulator, who applies the rules, as a system of 
checks and balances.- The state may be the owner of the regulated industry, which causes an obvious conflict of 
interest.- Ministries are often very close to political decision-makers and base their decisions on 
criteria that are different from those of regula-
tors. Politicians have to mediate and choose 
between various diverging preferences in their 
society. Regulators of a monopoly industry, in 
contrast, try to improve overall efficiency by 
applying legal and economic tools.- Regulation requires a long-term perspective. Grid operators for example, are incentivized to 
continuously invest in the grid infrastructure 
only with a high predictability and stability 
of legal and regulatory decisions. Whereas 
politicians tend to be subject to so-called 
short-termism (i. e. they often ignore long-term 
issues), an independent regulator is less vul-
nerable to short-termism as he is not elected 
by the public.
How can independence of the regulator from poli-
tics be achieved?- In the governance structure, the regulator can be an independent chamber of the ministry 
instead of an integrated department.- The appointment and especially the dismissal of the chief regulator(s) should be a transpar-
ent and well-defined process.- The regulatory office should have a budget that is largely independent from daily government 
business.- The duties and powers of the regulator should be laid down in a law. Specifically, the delinea-
tion of competence between the regulator and 
the ministry should be clearly described. In 
many countries, a general energy law contains 
a description of the duties and powers of the 
regulator. 
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- There should be a system of checks and bal-ances. Specifically, it has to be clear who is 
responsible for regulating and controlling the 
regulator. For example, this may be a judicial 
court system, or another regulatory author-
ity with an equal level of substance (e. g. a 
competition commission). A system of checks 
and balances allows greater regulator indepen-
dence.
It is important to note that the precise details of 
independence from politics or ministries depend 
strongly on the wider political and governmental 
structure in a country. 
Characteristics of a powerful regulator The need 
for a powerful regulator is more obvious: - The competences of the regulator need to be laid down in a law so that decisions can be 
enforced and challenged in court. In Europe, 
it has been extensively debated whether the 
liberalized parts of the energy sector could be 
regulated under a general competition law or 
whether sector-specific legislation is necessary 
to ensure the development of competition. 
The test of practical experience, for example 
in Germany, has shown convincingly that 
sector-specific regulation, executed by a sector-
specific regulator, is necessary (e. g. [2]). - The regulator needs to have an adequate budget. The stakes in industry are so high 
that it always pays off for the industry to hire 
consultants, lawyers, and lobbyists to argue 
their case; the regulator needs to address these 
claims. Moreover, good regulation is difficult 
and requires highly qualified staff; the regula-
tor will have to compete with the industry for 
qualified employees.- Electric power companies and other stake-holders should have the right to appeal the 
regulator’s decisions before a court or other 
tribunals empowered to conduct judicial 
reviews. Such a system of checks and balances 
makes the regulator more powerful because 
knowing that another institution may check 
and correct the regulator allows him to take 
more risk.
5.1.2 International practice
Long-term strategies for the electric power sec-
tor Medium-term to long-term plans with concrete 
goals regarding electricity consumption, energy ef-
ficiency, and/or renewables have been published in 
many industrialized and emerging countries. These 
plans often cover a period of at least 25 years (see 
[3], [4], and [5] for examples from UK, India, and 
Brazil). In its Federal Energy Concept, Germany has 
defined binding political goals for renewables until 
2050. The government has specified the future share 
of RES-E in gross electricity production with four 
goals for different time periods: by 2020 renewables 
are to have a share of at least 35 % in gross electricity 
consumption, a 50 % share by 2030, 65 % by 2040 
and 80 % by 2050 [6]. Similar targets have been de-
fined with respect to gross electricity consumption 
that is planned to decrease by 50 % until 2050.
Different studies commissioned by the German 
government analyze how to achieve the various gov-
ernment targets. At the same time, the scenarios for 
energy and power sector development put forward 
in these studies serve as a foundation for policy for-
mulation and a point of reference for further studies 
on more particular topics such as smart grid devel-
opment. A study entitled Long-term scenarios and 
strategies for the expansion of renewable energies in 
Germany, taking account of developments in Europe 
and across the world investigated potential scenar-
ios with respect to the development of renewable 
energies in Germany [7]. The results of this study 
are used to define strategies for the development 
of smart grids in Germany (e. g. how to finance the 
large investment requirements for smart grids). 
The role of an independent and powerful regula-
tor The OECD points at the importance of a clear 
definition of roles and responsibilities with respect 
to regulation. Within the OECD’s recommendations 
on regulation, the necessity of a common govern-
ment policy defining clear goals for the regulation 
process is specified. According to OECD, strategies 
shall be set for the implementation of these goals to 
give regulation a clearly defined framework [8]. Fur-
thermore, OECD emphasized the importance of an 
independent and powerful regulator for the efficient 
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development of the electricity sector. The govern-
ment has the task to clearly define the duties and the 
power of the regulator [8]. OECD also points out that 
independence of the regulator is essential since its 
decisions can have serious economic effects on the 
regulated parties. This is especially the case for smart 
grids, where the introduction of competition is di-
rectly related to economic effects for the incumbents.
The US American way: FERC
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) is the regulatory authority in the 
United States. It is an independent regulator 
responsible for the regulation of the interstate 
transmission of electricity, natural gas, and 
oil. In addition, FERC reviews proposals to 
build liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals and 
interstate natural gas pipelines, and it licenses 
hydro power projects. Further responsibilities of 
FERC outlined in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 
include, amongst others:- review of mergers and acquisitions as well as corporate transactions by electricity compa-
nies,- approval of siting and abandonment of interstate natural gas pipelines and storage 
facilities,- licensing and inspection of hydro power projects,- protection of the reliability of the high volt-age interstate transmission system through 
mandatory reliability standards,- monitoring and investigation of energy markets, and- administration of accounting and financial reporting regulations and conduction of 
regulated companies [58].
The independence and power of FERC are 
specified in 42 USC section 7172 g – Jurisdiction 
of the Commission [59]:
“The decision of the Commission involving any 
function within its jurisdiction, other than action 
by it on a matter referred to it pursuant to sec-
tion 7174 of this title, shall be final agency action 
within the meaning of section 704 of title 5 and 
shall not be subject to further review by the Secre-
tary or any officer or employee of the Department.”
The European Commission (EC) describes the char-
acteristics of a powerful regulator in articles 37 et 
seq. of Directive 2009/72/EC (see appendix E). It 
states, for instance, that a powerful regulator should 
fulfill the following tasks and requirements:- issue decisions that are binding for electric power companies,- impose effective, proportionate, and dissuasive penalties on electric power companies,- ensure high standards of universal and public service,- protect vulnerable customers, - contribute to the effectiveness of consumer protection measures, and- promote effective competition and the proper functioning of the electricity market. 
Germany has established BNetzA, a regulator in-
dependent from the industry and the government. 
The powers and duties of BNetzA are recorded in 
EnWG. Neither the ministry nor the industry can 
overrule the decisions taken by BNetzA. The regu-
lator’s decisions can only be challenged before the 
court. The German regulator makes use of its power 
to supervise the network charges of the grid opera-
tors, to prevent or remove obstacles in access to en-
ergy supply networks for suppliers and consumers, 
to standardize processes for switching the power 
retail company, and to improve the conditions for 
connecting new generators to the grid. Driven by 
the growing share of renewables and the resulting 
need to expand the grid infrastructure in Germany, 
the regulator also has the task of supervising the net-
work expansion process (see ▶ Sect. 4.4.1 for more 
detailed information on the German regulator).
5.1.3 Recommended approach 
for China
China has not yet formulated explicit targets for the 
long-term future of its electric power system. This 
situation risks creating uncertainty among smart 
grid investors and manufacturers which might con-
sequently postpone smart grid investments. Their 
uncertainty could be reduced by means of a clearly 
defined and committed long-term strategy for the 
electric power sector. Such a strategy should include 
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government targets with regard to future generation 
capacities, shares of different generation technologies 
(generation mix), and targets for energy efficiency. 
In Germany, the long-term energy strategy contains 
binding government goals for a period of roughly 
40  years, whereas long-term energy strategies in 
countries with higher economic growth rates and ac-
cordingly more dynamic energy sectors (e. g. India 
and Brazil) cover periods of approximately 25 years. 
The governance structure of China’s energy sys-
tem comprises a broad variety of ministries and in-
stitutions. The multiplicity of these stakeholders as 
well as the frequent reorganizations that have been 
taking place lead to a rather low degree of coordi-
nation and to a rather high degree of overlaps of 
competence between the various government actors 
involved in the power system regulation. Based on 
OECD recommendations and on the German ex-
periences, clearly defined roles and responsibilities 
concerning the regulation of the electricity sector 
and the development of smart grids would acceler-
ate and ease the smart grid development in China. 
The existence of an independent and powerful regu-
lator is by far the most important regulatory issue 
in this context. China’s earlier regulatory authority, 
SERC, was recently merged with NEA. NDRC and 
NEA are currently the most relevant regulatory 
institutions for the electricity sector. As they share 
regulatory competences and are subject to political 
and industrial influence, regulation in China is less 
powerful and independent than in countries such 
as Germany and the United States. Thus, specific 
attention should be paid to the development of an 
independent and powerful regulator in China. 
The recommended approach at a glance- A long-term strategy for the electric power system serves as a basis for more specific 
smart grid development strategies and 
objectives and is important for investors to 
gain investment security.- It is beneficial to centralize responsibilities for the regulation of the electricity sector in the 
hands of a single independent and powerful 
institution (regulator) that supervises the ef-
ficient development of the electric power sys-
tem in general and smart grids in particular.
5.2 Create level playing fields 
for access to power system 
infrastructure and information
Chinese context- Chinese grid operators are still integrated as they own and operate the electric power 
grids, are responsible for power retail, and 
invest in RES generation capacities. Also, 
power system data management (i. e. data 
collection and provision on grid status as 
well as generation and consumption quanti-
ties) is their task. Both major grid operators 
are currently developing systems for data 
management in smart grids. However, these 
systems focus on information collection by 
the grid operator for their own operation 
management, but not on information provi-
sion to other market actors. - New market actors are rarely participating in the development process of smart grids 
in China. Therefore, the innovation potential 
which could come from these new stake-
holders, for instance from the ICT sector, 
currently remains untapped.- The Chinese government plans to establish a modern energy market system to increase 
competition and affordability. In particular, 
the reform of state-owned enterprises and 
the introduction of more market-related ele-
ments are envisaged. 
5.2.1 Background
Benefits of integrating new market actors Smart 
grids are a relatively new concept aiming at mak-
ing grid operation more reliable and efficient and 
accelerating the emergence of new energy-related 
products and services. Due to the novelty of the 
smart grid approach, many technological advances 
and ideas are necessary for smart grids to be devel-
oped in an effective and efficient way. Experiences 
from other sectors and countries suggest that new 
market actors, i. e. new competitors in the electric 
85 5




















power sector or companies from other sectors such 
as the ICT industry, are key drivers of innovations: 
on the one hand, they offer innovative products 
and services that were not supplied by established 
market actors before. In a smart grid context, non-
incumbents create new business models and offer 
new products and services by making use of avail-
able power system information and infrastructure in 
an innovative way (see ▶ Sect. 4.4.2 for examples of 
new market actors in the German electricity sector). 
On the other hand, new market actors contribute to 
an increased level of competition which is usually 
considered to drive innovation, enable greater cost 
efficiency in production, lower retail price levels, 
and provide a higher variety of products and ser-
vices (see ▶ Sect. 2.3).
A fair access to essential facilities is a prerequisite 
for new market actor integration New market ac-
tors can only enter the markets if equal and non-
discriminatory access to essential facilities (i. e. a 
level playing field) is guaranteed [9] [10]. In smart 
grids, level playing fields should be secured in two 
respects:- First, equal access to the physical grid infra-structure is important. Since connecting new 
power generation and consumption units to 
the power grid is laborious and often associ-
ated with high costs, grid operators might have 
a tendency to discriminate in favor of affiliated 
companies or against generators and consum-
ers in remote regions. Regulation must prevent 
such a discriminatory behavior.- Second, access to power system information and data is required. Power system informa-
tion and data are getting increasingly impor-
tant and are a prerequisite for new market 
actors to offer new and innovative products 
and services [11]. This does not mean that 
each established or new market actor has ac-
cess to all power system information, or that 
information is even open to the public; instead 
it means that each eligible market actor has 
equal and fair access to the information rel-
evant for his business model. This is the task of 
power system data management, which should 
be organized in a way that both established 
and new market actors can participate in the 
rule-making process and can trust on non-
discriminatory access. 
Concepts for a non-discriminatory access to 
power system information Two concepts should 
ensure a non-discriminatory access to power system 
information and data in smart grids: - Technology neutrality is a regulatory concept for the telecommunications sector that was in-
troduced by the European Commission in Di-
rective 2002/21/EG. In this context, technology 
neutrality means that the regulator does not 
impose or discriminate in favor of a particular 
type of technology. This concept has been ap-
plied to several technological issues in Europe, 
for example with respect to the development 
of broadband internet, where the regulator left 
it open to the market to decide between the 
deployment of different technologies such as 
digital subscriber line (DSL), power-line com-
munications (PLC), cable modem, or satellite. 
Technology neutrality is also important for 
smart grids, e. g. with respect to the question 
regarding which infrastructure should be used 
for the power system information exchange. 
This issue is currently being discussed under 
the headline of advanced metering infrastruc-
ture (AMI).1 The development of AMI is in its 
early introduction phase. Therefore, what spe-
cific technology should be used for building up 
the necessary infrastructure has not yet been 
settled. Different technologies could be ap-
plied, e. g. PLC, wireless, or fiber technologies. 
In this context, regulation needs to ensure that 
the most efficient technology will be applied, 
independently of which company supplies the 
technology. - Provider neutrality is another general regula-tory concept that is also currently applied in 
the telecommunications sector in Europe. 
It basically states that the regulator should 
ensure that regulation does not discriminate 
1 AMI is defined as “systems [that] are comprised of state-of-
the-art electronic/digital hardware and software, which com-
bine interval data measurement with continuously available 
remote communications. These systems enable measurement 
of detailed, time-based information and frequent collection 
and transmittal of such information to various parties.” [60].
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against particular service providers. Applied 
to smart grids, this means that the regulator 
should ensure that established and new market 
actors are treated equally and allowed to offer 
services on an equal footing in smart grids. On 
the one hand, services could be provided by es-
tablished players (e. g. DSO), on the other hand 
new market actors could provide complemen-
tary services or even substitute services of 
established players for the costumer. Provider 
neutrality should consequently ensure that 
competitive advantages (e. g. best technolo-
gies or low costs/prices) and not the provider’s 
market power affects consumer’s choice. 
Defining roles and responsibilities of all market 
actors eases new market actor integration Lib-
eralized energy markets for energy resources, elec-
tricity, capacity, or ancillary services necessitate 
the exchange of large amounts of information and 
data between different market actors. A mounting 
number of market actors leads to a more inten-
sive inter-company exchange of operational and 
business-related information and data. Against 
this background, it is of critical importance that all 
market actors get assigned their respective roles and 
responsibilities [12]: on the one hand, they have to 
know the stakes and information requirements of 
their business partners and other actors in the elec-
tric power sector to better understand their business 
opportunities and their own contribution towards 
smart grid development. On the other hand, spe-
cific rules and data standards for inter-company 
exchange of business-related information help to re-
duce the transaction costs among all market actors.
5.2.2 International practice
Ensuring technology neutrality For the develop-
ment of smart grids, the concept of technology neu-
trality is particularly important with respect to the 
development of the ICT infrastructure. In principle, 
different communication technologies could be 
applied (PLC, 3G, etc.) and different data storages 
types could be used. Eurelectric, the association of 
the electricity industry in Europe, has defined basic 
requirements for the ICT infrastructures in smart 
grids. The German regulator has addressed this issue 
as well and specified that, currently, a medium-scale 
broadband connection should fulfill the necessary 
requirements to build up the AMI for smart grids. 
However, the German regulator stresses that with the 
use of real-time data the quality requirements con-
cerning availability and latency cannot be fulfilled by 
all existing ICT solutions on the market [13].
Basic requirements for ICT infrastructures 
in smart grids
According to Eurelectric, the most important 
requirements for ICT in the context of smart 
grids are to:- “Ensure that telecoms infrastructure and links are absolutely reliable, robust, meet opera-
tional requirements in terms of speed, capacity 
and latency and will be available at all times, 
particularly at times of critical incidents (e. g. 
be resilient to power outages for several hours 
because they are needed to rebuild the grid. - Provide well manageable and robust access control and user privileges mechanisms to the 
smart grid components and systems. - Guarantee the confidentiality, integrity and authentication of all smart grid-related com-
munication events. - Guarantee a robust physical protection for the smart grid components as well as for the whole 
communication network. - Ensure that mission-critical telecommunica-tions services are still alive during and up to the 
end of a wide area 72 hours blackout. - Implement strong monitoring systems to keep track of all the smart grid activity, implementing 
Security Information and Event Management 
(SIEM) systems for security related incidents 
analysis and maintain well trained security 
response teams to have a strong and quick 
response in the case of any security violation. - Warrant a true real time transfer of informa-tion: for a part the smart grid can be seen as an 
extension of the current SCADA systems; fully 
available at any time and the guaranteeing the 
perfect transfer of commands and feedback 
confirmation of the system operations. 
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- Have an end-to-end security approach to guar-antee a transversal security layer on the smart 
grid.”
Source: Wording from Eurelectric [61]
Ensuring provider neutrality Provider neutral-
ity is a key requirement for third-party access in 
general and is currently being discussed within 
the evaluation of different governance models for 
power system information management in smart 
grids. In this context, the European Commission 
(EC) has been trying to define which actor should 
be responsible for the data handling in smart grids. 
The models under discussion are based on unbun-
dled companies or new market actors. The discus-
sion on the different governance models is ongoing 
and no decision has been taken yet. Three potential 
models are currently being discussed (for more de-
tails see [11]):- DSO as market facilitator: This model al-locates responsibility for power system data 
management, including collection of data and 
construction of the necessary information in-
frastructure to the DSO. The concentration of 
responsibilities within one institution has the 
advantage of centralized internal coordination 
and management of the ICT infrastructure. 
The main disadvantage of a DSO-centered 
solution addresses discrimination concerns. In 
principle, unbundling prescriptions require the 
neutrality of DSO in Europe. Yet, it is doubt-
ful whether full neutrality can be guaranteed 
because of asymmetric information to the 
disadvantage of the regulator. This concept 
requires significant regulatory oversight. How-
ever, it is not new to the regulator, as the DSO 
are already regulated.- Independent central data hub (CDH): The CDH would be responsible for power sys-
tem data management in smart grids and for 
central data storage under the supervision of 
the regulator. A key advantage of this approach 
is the neutrality of the market facilitator and 
the non-discriminatory access to information 
for third parties. The key challenge for this 
concept is the need to establish coordination 
mechanisms between the parties involved, e. g. 
the network owners/system operators and the 
CDH. It should be noted that the regulator 
needs to ensure that the provider of the CDH 
does not discriminate against other parties or 
abuse its market power.- Data access point manager (DAM): The DAM concept focuses on a competitive market 
for power system information management 
and proposes to establish independent and 
unregulated service providers that consumers 
can choose from. Each DAM offers to build up 
the necessary information infrastructure for 
the consumer. Importantly, the DAM does not 
store the data centrally. Storage remains decen-
tralized with the users, giving consumers full 
control of their own data. The DAM only acts 
as an interface which allows each consumer to 
decide which commercial party gets access to 
its main data. Such a decentralized approach 
requires a high degree of standardization to 
ensure flawless system integration. The DSO 
would have to control the quality of services 
provided by the DAM and each regulator 
would need to define the basic principles of 
the DAM to integrate them into the national 
electricity system.
Defining roles and responsibilities of all market 
actors At the European level, the Smart Grids Task 
Force (SGTF) of the European Commission broadly 
defined roles and responsibilities of various market 
actors in smart grids [12]: in a first step, all relevant 
smart grid actors (including companies from all 
supply chain stages of the electric power sector, end-
users as well as influencing actors such as regulators, 
legislation authorities and standardization bodies) 
have been defined (see appendix E for an overview 
of all smart grid actors defined). In a second step, 
current as well as future responsibilities related to 
the smart grid development have been described 
for all actors. The work of SGTF should be under-
stood as a practical toolset and guideline for further 
developments and business models for use by grid 
operators and grid users [12]. 
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Future responsibilities of grid operators 
in smart grids
“[…] it appears that it is the DSOs who will have 
to face the biggest challenges so that Smart Grids 
will become a reality. The reasons include;- Growing distributed generation, active man-agement of demand, local storage and electric 
vehicles (EV) will impact the DSO infrastruc-
ture. Thus the DSO will have to be an active 
participant in all such projects along with the 
actors implementing these projects as these 
projects will fundamentally change today’s 
relatively static distribution system to a much 
more dynamic distribution system.- As more fluctuating distributed generation will feed into the distribution system, gathering 
and handling the data about the state of the 
distribution system will be one key issue for the 
DSO.- Attention will need to be paid to ensure that all privacy and system security recommendations 
(in line with the provisions defined by EG2) will 
be adhered to. Ownership of the data, length 
of time data is stored etc. will all need to be 
addressed in an appropriate way.- The data collected will enable the DSOs to fulfil their duty in relation to the overall grid stability 
and operational security, given that more and 
more distributed generation will be connected 
to the distribution grid.
In order to resolve the above challenges, the 
DSOs will have to continue upgrading their grid 
infrastructure, control centres and educating their 
employees accordingly.
The TSOs will have to provide more support & 
communication of data to the DSOs, but will also 
require more specific information from the DSOs, 
especially with more distributed generation com-
ing from the distribution grids. In order to achieve 
this, both TSOs and DSOs need to ensure that the 
standards they implement for communication 
and data exchange are compatible. It also follows 
that the TSOs will have to gradually redesign 
power system control as well as market informa-
tion management relating to forecasting the 
overall system load in conjunction with the DSOs. 
At the same time, the DSOs will have to strengthen 
their role in providing the required data relating 
to the distributed generation, local storage and 
electric vehicles within the distribution grid.
Both TSO and DSO should be able to execute their 
active role in Smart Grid management by ensuring 
more sophisticated legal provisions for system 
security management under increased uncer-
tainty. Following the analysis about funding […], 
these mechanisms should include the ability to 
interfere with the planned market activities in case 
of disturbed or emergency operational conditions, 
without “automatic” socialization of the related 
costs to other grid users.
Finally, the role of grid communications will sig-
nificantly increase as much more data will have to 
be gathered and exchanged frequently, which will 
be in turn used for different purposes by the grid 
operators and other service providers. As stated 
above, the standardization of communication 
protocols as well as clear rules for the handling 
and the security of this data will have to be devel-
oped and enforced. The security of the grid and 
supply systems as well as the privacy of customer 
data must remain the top priority.”
Source: Wording from Smart Grids Task Force [11]
At the German level, roles and responsibilities of 
companies in the electric power sector are further 
specified in EnWG, with an emphasis on specific 
conditions in Germany. This definition of roles and 
responsibilities in Germany’s most prominent en-
ergy law contributed to a high understanding on 
business opportunities and legal obligations among 
affected companies in Germany. 
With respect to the inter-company exchange of 
business-related information, BNetzA issued the 
so-called Business Processes for Delivery of Electric-
ity to Customers (GPKE) based on the United Na-
tions Electronic Data Interchange for Administration, 
Commerce and Transport (UN/EDIFACT) in 2006 
(see [14] for more information). GPKE standardize 
inter-company communication and data exchange 
in the case of typical business processes such as bill-
ing of customers or customers changing their power 
retail company. In reducing transaction costs of typ-
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ical business processes, GPKE ease the emergence 
of new market actors.
5.2.3 Recommended approach 
for China
The main electricity sector reform of 2002 mandated 
the separation (or unbundling) of the state-owned 
vertically integrated utility responsible for all supply 
chain stages across China into five big power genera-
tion companies, two major grid operators handling 
transmission, distribution and retail as well as four 
power service corporations. China’s power genera-
tion sector can be described as liberalized, as it po-
tentially allows competition between the major five 
generation companies and the thousands of smaller 
local and regional generation companies. Chinese 
grid operators are not completely unbundled as they 
own and operate the electric power grids, are respon-
sible for retail, and also invest into RES generation 
capacities. Recently a potential separation of grid 
operators into transmission and distribution com-
panies or into smaller, regional businesses has been 
subject of debate [15]. With respect to smart grid 
developments, non-incumbents (e. g. from the ICT 
sector) are not yet actively participating in the devel-
opment process. Therefore, the innovation potential 
which could come from these new stakeholders, for 
instance the ICT sector, currently remains untapped.
Experiences from Europe show that defining 
roles and responsibilities of established and new 
market actors (including specific rules and data 
standards for inter-company exchange of business-
related information) leads to a better understanding 
of business opportunities and helps to reduce the 
transaction costs among all market actors. As such, 
the definition of roles and responsibilities contrib-
uted to the emergence of new market actors in the 
European electricity sector.
Currently, the management of power system 
data (e. g. grid status information or metering data 
on electricity generation and consumption) is in the 
hands of China’s grid operators. The concepts of tech-
nology and provider neutrality are not applied. As 
soon as new market actors are to be integrated in the 
electric power system, power system data manage-
ment will become more relevant on a broader scale. 
The regulator should develop a governance system 
that will ensure provider and technology neutrality 
and a level playing field for all stakeholders. Non-
discriminatory access to information in smart grids 
is of particular importance for third parties to be able 
to develop their business plans. Neutral informa-
tion management is therefore a key issue. There are 
various models currently being discussed in Europe. 
However, there is not yet one preferred solution fit-
ting all possible contexts. Therefore, recommending a 
best practice approach to China in this context is not 
yet advisable. A better approach would be to evaluate 
what governance model best suits China to ensure 
non-discriminatory access to information for third 
parties in the near future.
The recommended approach at a glance- Defining roles and responsibilities of estab-lished and non-established market actors in 
the smart grid development facilitates the 
emergence of new market actors and helps 
to make the exchange of business-related 
information and data more efficient. - It should be evaluated which framework for smart grid data management is able to 
ensure provider and technology neutrality 
in China. On this basis, a suitable framework 
needs to be established.
5.3 Introduce network regulation 
for efficient investment 
incentives for electricity grid 
expansion and upgrade
Chinese context- China’s main challenge in the electricity sec-tor is how to handle the massive electricity 
grid expansion necessary to facilitate the 
country’s rapid economic growth and to 
integrate the increasing number of RES. A 
network regulation system that focuses on 
facilitating investments is lacking.
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- At present, there is no explicit price for power transmission and distribution (net-
work charge) based on actual costs. The 
source of grid operators’ income is the dif-
ference between the on-grid and the retail 
price for electricity, which are both fixed by 
the government. 
5.3.1 Background
Network regulation for smart grids Smart grids 
require substantial investment and innovation, es-
pecially from the grid operators. In setting network 
charges (i. e. prices for power transmission and dis-
tribution), regulating institutions have an important 
influence on the investment behavior of grid opera-
tors. Which regulatory scheme (i. e. which specific 
method used for calculating network charges) is 
best suited to set incentives for efficient investment 
is far from settled: in general, regulation should fa-
cilitate necessary investment and avoid unnecessary 
investment at the same time. 
In a smart grid context, incentivizing efficient 
investment into the infrastructure is becoming even 
more important because benefits of innovation and 
investment in smart grid technologies may not al-
ways accrue to the investor (more information on 
this issue is presented below). In these cases, addi-
tional incentive schemes are required to encourage 
grid operators to invest specifically in smart grid 
technologies.
The benefits of regulating only the monopolistic 
bottlenecks Even if it is far from settled which reg-
ulatory scheme is best suited to set incentives for 
efficient investment, it is generally accepted that net-
work regulation should focus on the monopolistic 
bottlenecks (transmission and distribution grids), 
leaving the commercial businesses (generation, 
trade and retail) to competitive forces and moni-
toring by competition law [16], [17]. This approach 
is referred to as disaggregated regulation. Also with 
respect to the smart grid development, it has been 
emphasized that regulation should only focus on 
network charges and network planning while all 
other aspects should be subject to the market and 
competition law [13].
Disaggregated regulation has the following ad-
vantages:- Regulation inevitably provides misdirected in-centives: only competitive markets are able to 
provide incentives to hold prices down to mar-
ginal costs and to minimize long-run costs. 
Regulated markets can only do one or the 
other but not both [18]. In this light, a regula-
tory focus on the natural monopoly part of the 
supply chain avoids misdirected incentives at 
the competitive parts of the supply chain.- Leaving a stage of the supply chain unregu-lated eases the market entry of new market 
actors [19] because requirements for licenses, 
permits and monitoring obligations in regu-
lated markets raise the investment needed to 
enter a market. - A focus on regulation of the natural monopoly may improve the quality of regulation because 
the regulator’s most skilled employees can 
more easily focus their efforts on the natural 
monopoly part of the supply chain. It will then 
be easier for them to get a grip on the regu-
lated firms’ cost-developments and investment 
requirements. - Different stages of the electric power system may require different types of regulation. In 
case the regulator decides to regulate the retail 
stage of the electricity value chain, it is im-
portant to set incentives for quality of service 
and cost efficiency of power retail companies 
and to allow differentiated tariffs for different 
consumer groups. Regulation for networks, in 
turn, needs to set incentives for efficient invest-
ment, as network expansion has become so 
urgent.
Network regulation and investment incen-
tives Disaggregated regulation entails the necessity 
to apply a specific network regulation scheme. The 
challenge of network regulation is setting efficient 
investment incentives (i. e. allowing necessary in-
vestment while avoiding unnecessary investment) 
because the regulator is confronted with the follow-
ing dilemma: the regulated companies know their 
own cost structures and market opportunities bet-
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ter than the regulator. As a consequence, regulation 
cannot provide full-powered incentives to incentiv-
ize necessary investment and to avoid unnecessary 
investment at the same time [18]. Regulators must 
always accept a trade-off between both goals.2 The 
regulator’s challenge is to achieve acceptable levels 
of both goals at the same time. In accordance with 
the trade-off described above, two polar cases are 
commonly distinguished in regulation theory:- Rate-of-return (also known as cost-pass-through) regulation fixes the rate of return 
and requires revenues to adjust according to 
underlying costs. If costs go down, revenues 
should go down and if costs go up, revenues 
may go up as well. Therefore, the incentives to 
reduce costs are low. In fact, firms make profits 
by inflating the capital base as this is the basis 
for the rate of return. With cost-pass-through 
regulation, firms may actually have strong 
incentives to overinvest (i. e. they do not avoid 
unnecessary investment).- Price-cap regulation, also called revenue-cap regulation or RPI-X regulation, tries to avoid 
these very incentives [20]. Price-cap regulation 
fixes the price or revenue path ex-ante for the 
next regulatory period, irrespective of the actual 
cost development during the regulatory period. 
If the firm succeeds in reducing its costs more 
than anticipated by the regulator, the firm can 
keep the additional profits; this is an incen-
tive to minimize costs. Therefore, this type of 
regulation is often called incentive regulation.3 
A counterargument for price-cap regulation is 
a situation in which costs do not go down, but 
tend upwards. This typically happens if net-
works need to be expanded. Under the typical 
RPI-X regulation, firms then have an incentive 
to avoid necessary investments [21].
2 Note that the inevitability of this trade-off has been es-
tablished repeatedly and with great rigor [18]. However, 
the extent of the regulator’s dilemma can be reduced if 
the regulator has a fair amount of information on the cost 
structures and market opportunities of the regulated com-
panies.
3 The term incentive regulation is unfortunately somewhat 
misleading. Regulation always sets incentives: the ques-
tion is merely what incentives and whether they are good 
or bad.
The necessity of additional incentive schemes in 
a smart grid context An additional challenge is 
starting to emerge given the decentralization of de-
cisions in the smart grid value chain. This challenge 
can be illustrated through the following example: 
suppose a new market actor, e. g. the operator of 
a wind farm, wants to invest in storage capacities 
close to a wind farm as the facility can store elec-
tricity from the wind farm at times of congestion 
in the grid. Imagine that this investment would be 
economically more efficient than expanding the 
distribution grid. From the perspective of the grid 
operator, only the costs associated with the invest-
ment in the grid infrastructure are usually taken 
into account for calculating the network charges. 
Thus, the grid operator has no incentive to support 
the investment in the economically more efficient 
storage facility. The regulatory framework needs to 
take account of the spill-over effects and allow cost- 
and revenue-sharing models to incentivize invest-
ment in smart grid solutions, like the storage facility 
in the example above. 
5.3.2 International practice
Regulation of monopolistic bottlenecks and net-
work regulation schemes In Europe and many 
other countries with liberalized electricity markets, 
regulation focuses on the natural monopoly part of 
the supply chain, i. e. power transmission and dis-
tribution grids. The other elements of the supply 
chain, i. e. generation and retail, are liberalized and 
governed by general competition law only. As such, 
European power sector regulators focus primarily 
on the regulation of network charges for transmis-
sion and distribution grids. In fact, most of them are 
not even authorized to intervene in the competitive 
parts of the electricity sector. 
With respect to specific network regulation 
schemes, the cost-pass-through regulation was tra-
ditionally applied in many European countries and 
the United States. Since this regulation scheme does 
not set incentives for an efficient grid operation, 
which is especially important in power systems with 
a limited need for grid expansion and upgrade, most 
European countries and some parts of the United 
States abandoned cost-pass-through regulation in 
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favor of different variants of price cap regulation.4 
Germany for example, applies an RPI-X regulation 
scheme since 2009 (see ▶ Sect. 4.4.4 for more de-
tails). Currently, only Belgium and most parts of the 
United States [22], [23] still apply cost-pass-through 
regulation. Owing to the large network investment 
requirements associated with the transition towards 
more RES and smart grids, a reform of the RPI-X 
system to facilitate efficient investment is currently 
being discussed in Germany and other parts of Eu-
rope. In the light of these developments, it can be 
seen that no single regulatory scheme is preferable 
in every situation. In the end, regulatory schemes 
have to take into account the current needs of each 
country under consideration.
Regulatory approaches setting incentives for ef-
ficient investments Network regulation should 
set incentives for network operators to develop a 
secure and stable network at the lowest cost. Also, 
network regulation should set incentives to invest 
in smart grid solutions, especially in solutions that 
defer costly investments in grid expansion. Three 
possible incentive instruments have been applied 
in countries such as Italy, the United States, and the 
United Kingdom. These instruments are described 
below. However, note that this list is not compre-
hensive:- Explicit investment incentives could be ap-plied. Such incentives could be so-called rate-
of-return adders. The idea behind rate-of-re-
turn adders is that network operators can earn 
additional return on equity (ROE) for specific 
projects selected by the regulator. The rate-of-
return adder (usually between 2 % and 3 %) 
increases the incentive for the network opera-
tor to build this specific line or to invest in the 
respective project. This concept has proven to 
be successful in Italy. Here, roughly 71 % of all 
investments made by the Italian TSO Terna 
in 2009 were priority projects with a rate-of-
return adder. In Italy, this adder is provided for 
4 Even if the general idea behind the price cap regulation 
scheme is identical in the different countries, specific for-
mula and parameters (e. g. the length of the regulation 
period or the allowed return of grid operators) differ from 
country to country. A more specific and detailed overview 
of network regulation in Europe can be found in [22]. 
twelve years after the investment [24]. In Italy’s 
case, it can be observed that overall invest-
ments, not only those with the rate-of-return 
adder, increased since the introduction of the 
adder. Similar effects were observed in the 
United States [24]. - Explicit profit-sharing mechanisms, or sliding scales, are currently applied in the UK [25]. 
They can contribute to strengthening the 
incentives for investment in smart grid tech-
nologies. The idea behind the profit-sharing 
mechanism is that the grid operator is allowed 
to keep a share of a cost reduction achieved 
through the application of a smart application 
(e. g. a storage facility) as a substitute for grid 
investments. If the costs for the smart applica-
tion are lower than the investment in the grid 
infrastructure, but both measures result in a 
more stable grid, then the grid operator has 
an incentive to invest in the smart application. 
Note that the sliding scales have to be granted 
by the regulator and that calculating their size 
is a complex task.- The innovation bonus is an additional instru-ment motivating the grid operator to invest in 
smart grid technologies. The innovation bonus 
is determined by the regulator and grants 
funds for R&D activities of the grid opera-
tors. The additional costs for the R&D activity 
are thereby at least partially refunded to the 
operator and do not reduce the operator’s 
revenues. The innovation bonus is currently 
applied in the UK as well and has proved to 
be an efficient instrument [25]. Similar to 
rate-of-return adders, innovation bonuses can 
be designed and granted rather easily by the 
regulator.
5.3.3 Recommended approach 
for China
China does currently not apply disaggregated regu-
lation, but electricity wholesale and retail prices are 
subject to regulation. A basic step in the regulatory 
environment would be to focus on the monopolistic 
networks alone. This would avoid misdirected in-
centives at the generation and retail sectors, ease the 
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emergence of new market actors, and improve the 
quality of regulation. In applying a specific regula-
tion scheme, the regulator should focus on setting 
efficient investment incentives. As there is no regu-
lation scheme suitable to all countries in all contexts, 
the specific design of a regulation scheme for China 
has to be elaborated with great rigor. The consider-
able investment needs in China’s electric power grid 
and the recent experiences with RPI-X regulation in 
Germany should be taken into account. 
China faces the primary challenge of having to 
increase security of supply. In addition, the potential 
that comes with smart grids can only be realized 
if there is an incentive for grid operators to invest 
into smart solutions (e. g. storage facilities or DSM). 
Thus, network regulation in China should specifi-
cally focus on incentives for security of supply and 
smart solutions. The application of rate-of-return 
adders for high priority projects for security of sup-
ply and for investment in smart solutions should be 
evaluated. 
The recommended approach at a glance- Regulating only the natural monopoly part of the electric power sector (transmission 
and distribution grids) improves the op-
portunities for market entry of new market 
actors, reduces misdirected incentives, and 
may increase quality of regulation. - Network regulation should focus on setting efficient investment incentives balancing 
between network expansion and smart 
grid applications in an economically ef-
ficient way. Specifically, the application of 
rate-of-return adders for projects with a 
high priority for security of supply might be 
interesting for China. Furthermore, profit-
sharing mechanisms or innovation bonuses 
could be applied to increase the diffusion of 
innovative technologies in China’s electricity 
sector.
5.4 Coordinate network expansion 
planning for electricity grid 
expansion and upgrade
Chinese context- From 2010 to 2015, generation and grid ca-pacities are planned to increase by roughly 
50 % in order to cope with the steadily grow-
ing demand. Their further expansion beyond 
that point in time is inevitable. - RES generation capacities are expected to increase out of proportion – their share in 
the electricity mix will increase significantly. - Electricity grid expansion planning is cur-rently organized in a top-down process with 
low transparency and little involvement of 
actors other than government authorities 
and grid operators.
5.4.1 Background
Towards a more decentralized system So far, elec-
tric power grids have been designed to transport the 
electricity generated in central power stations (e. g. 
coal-fired power plants) to industrial or residential 
load centers. The subordinated distribution grids 
have only been used to redistribute the electricity 
towards end-consumers. Single distribution grids 
have been operated quite independently from those 
in other areas. In this setting, a coordination of the 
necessary grid expansion measures has been impor-
tant mainly at the level of transmission grids. 
The current developments towards more inter-
mittent RES and actively involved end-consumers 
result in a more decentralized system with bidirec-
tional flows of electricity and information. Massive 
investments in the power grid infrastructure have 
to be undertaken to cope with these developments, 
especially at the distribution grid level: in Germany 
for example, the investment needs in the distribu-
tion grid infrastructure are considerably higher 
than in the transmission grid infrastructure [21], 
[26] because roughly 97 % of RES in Germany are 
connected to the distribution grids [27]. A coordi-
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nation of the necessary grid expansion measures 
is especially important at the level of distribution 
grids to facilitate an efficient allocation of invest-
ments and reduce economic inefficiencies as much 
as possible.
Fragmentation of interests Up to now, invest-
ments in generation capacities were made mainly 
by operators of large-scale centralized power plants, 
a situation that allows grid operators to collect in-
formation on where and when a new power plant 
is planned for construction rather easily. Network 
expansion planning was a task with a moderate 
complexity organized by grid operators, operators 
of large-scale centralized power plants, and coordi-
nating government institutions. 
Currently, the number and the heterogeneity of 
stakeholders with interests in network expansion 
planning increases: - Investments into distributed RES are made by a larger number of more heterogeneous com-
panies or even by private investors in many 
countries [28]. Therefore, advanced planning 
on how much new grid capacity need to be 
built in what area becomes more difficult for 
the network operators. - The trend towards smart grids is associated with an increasing amount of new market 
actors with diverse interests. As the business 
models of new market actors often depend 
on available grid capacities, their interests are 
also relevant for long-term electricity network 
planning alongside the stakes of established 
market actors making the process of stake-
holder consultation more complex. If the 
interests of stakeholders such as grid operators 
on different voltage levels, power plant opera-
tors, industrial consumers, representatives of 
small end-users, environmental groups, local 
governments and central government minis-
tries are not coordinated effectively, network 
expansion risks being economically inefficient 
[29]. 
Against this background, it becomes of vital impor-
tance to develop a long-term centrally coordinated 
NDP that includes plans and interests of all relevant 
market actors and network users at an early stage.
5.4.2 International practice
Network expansion planning in Europe The EU 
requires each member state to develop a 10-year 
NDP currently focusing on transmission grid ex-
pansion but not distribution grid expansion [30]. 
Given the high investment and coordination needs 
on the distribution grid level, the non-coordination 
of distribution grid expansion unnecessarily inflates 
costs of network expansion. In Germany, a group of 
geographically adjacent DSO consequently started 
initiatives to coordinate distribution grid expansion 
planning [31].
The network development plans are based on 
several scenarios (three scenarios in the case of Ger-
many) concerning the future development of RES 
and the corresponding electricity system in each 
member state. The national planning processes 
are accompanied by 10-year network development 
plans of the ENTSO-E. Starting in 2010, these plans 
are to be issued every two years. The main results of 
the version published in 2012 are:- One third of investments planned in the first network development plan of 2010 are expe-
riencing implementation delays owing to long 
approval processes.- 52,300 km of extra high voltage transmis-sion lines clustered in 100 projects have to be 
modernized or constructed, mainly due to 
bottlenecks related to RES integration. - 20 megatons CO2 can be saved in the period up to 2022 due to further market integration in 
Europe. - Extending the grid by about 1.3 % enables the addition of 3 % more generation capacities 
[32]. 
Network expansion planning in Germany In Ger-
many, the rules for developing the national NDP are 
defined in § 12 EnWG and the NABEG. . Figure 5.1 
illustrates the different steps towards the network 
development plan in Germany. These are [33]: - The starting point in the network development process is the scenario framework. It is drafted 
by the four German TSO and includes fore-
casts relating to the development of electricity 
generation, the shares of different generation 
technologies, and power consumption for the 
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next ten years. To achieve a realistic forecast, 
three different scenarios based on different as-
sumptions regarding the increase in generation 
capacities, RES expansion, and CO2 abatement 
are considered. The scenarios are submitted to 
BNetzA, which approves them after a public 
consultation process. During this process, dis-
tribution grid operators and other interested 
parties have the opportunity to comment on 
the different scenarios.- The four TSO subsequently employ the ap-proved scenarios for calculating network 
expansion requirements. Selecting the neces-
sary expansion measures and assigning a 
timeframe (two to ten years depending on 
the respective project) for their realization 
leads to a first draft of the respective network 
development plan. BNetzA again assesses this 
first draft within a public consultation process. 
During this process, the drafted network 
development plan is published on a public 
website and can be commented from various 
stakeholders and citizens. The network devel-
opment plan is then revised by the TSO and 
once again assessed by BNetzA. Furthermore, 
BNetzA conducts the environmental impact 
assessment.- Based on the final version of the network de-velopment plan and the environmental impact 
report published at the same time, BNetzA has 
the responsibility to draft the so-called Federal 
Requirements Plan, which is finally brought in 
the parliamentary legislative procedure. 
While this process currently focuses on transmis-
sion grids only, it might serve as a best-practice ex-
ample of how to organize the grid expansion plan-
ning on the distribution grid level as well.
The role of stakeholder platforms One of the main 
goals of BMWi with respect to grid development is 
to involve new market actors in the strategic smart 
grid planning process. One prominent example of 
the ministry’s activities is the Future-oriented En-
ergy Grids Platform, which was founded in 2010. In 
February 2011, the platform was transformed into 
a permanent dialogue forum [35]. The platform in-
volves all relevant parties of the electricity sector: 
Federal Requirements Plan
reflects the need to develop the 
network in a concrete way
Scenario Framework reflects  
the development of the energy 
policy framework (e.g. production 
capacities, consumption, etc.). It 
is the starting point to define the 
need for network development.
Federal Requirements Plan (Bundesbedarfsplan)
Consultation of German Network 
Development Plan and of the 
Environment Report by BNetzA
Draft Federal Requirements Plan    
by BNetzA
Draft Scenario Framework by TSO
Consultation
Approval of the TSO “Scenario  
Framework” by BNetzA
Approved “Scenario Framework”
Establishment of the Draft German 
Network Development Plan 
involving all TSO by June 3, 2012
 . Fig. 5.1 Process for the network development plan in Germany, adapted from [34]
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grid operators, ICT-companies, environmental and 
consumer associations, research institutions, and 
representatives of several ministries and govern-
mental institutions. One of the platform’s main tasks 
is to discuss the draft documents of the network de-
velopment plan. The platform is therefore an impor-
tant instrument for the regulator to get feedback on 
NDP. Besides this task, the grid platform serves as a 
discussion platform for planning and approval pro-
cedures, the regulatory framework for investments 
into networks, grid connection of offshore wind 
farms, funding and testing of new technologies, 
development of smart meters, system stability, and 
applications of storage systems for network stability.
. Figure 5.2 shows the organizational structure of 
the platform. The plenary which adopts recommen-
dations on actions is hosted by BMWi. The platform 
is subdivided in four different working groups, one 
of them directly responsible for smart grid issues. 
The different working groups provide consulting 
services for BMWi or other government institutions, 
make publicly available the results of their meetings, 
draft documents and recommendations, and support 
other publicly funded initiatives for smart grid devel-
opment. The working group responsible for network 
development planning for example, proposed a joint 
grid connection process for offshore wind farms as 
well as an offshore master plan. In the meantime, both 
propositions have been included in NABEG [36].
5.4.3 Recommended approach 
for China
China faces a high need to expand the existing elec-
tricity network within the next few years. On both 
levels of the grid, transmission and distribution, 
this need is driven by growing consumer demand 
for electricity and the integration of RES. Support-
ing and guiding the formulation of a consistent 
and comprehensive concept regarding the set-up 
of China’s future electric power grid is a key task 
for Chinese energy sector regulation. Government 
guidance is particularly important in the context of 
the build-up of RES generation capacities and smart 
grids both resulting in an increasing number of 
stakeholders involved in the electric power system. 
Today, there are no formalized institutions that 
acknowledge stakeholder interests in grid expansion 
planning in China. Therefore, stakeholder involve-
ment currently focuses mainly on the grid opera-
tors, the government, and the China Electric Power 
Planning Institute. Other stakeholders are not inte-
grated into the process in a formal way. 
Plenary
Chair: Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and 
Energy
adopts recommendations on action regarding questions of 

















Coordination / Organization / External Relations 
 . Fig. 5.2 Structure of the Future Oriented Energy Grids Platform, adapted from [35]
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Three aspects are especially important with re-
spect to the coordination of network expansion in 
China: - First, the institution that has the responsibil-ity to supervise the network planning process 
should be specified. Experience in Germany 
illustrates that a government institution such 
as the regulator should take this responsibil-
ity. This has the primary advantage that results 
from the planning process can be transferred 
directly into the government policy-making 
process. - Second, an evaluation should be made of which stakeholders are relevant for network 
expansion planning. Specifically, formal co-
ordination between grid operators and power 
generation companies seems to be of great 
importance to align grid and generation capac-
ity expansion processes. A platform such as 
the Future Oriented Energy Grids Platform in 
Germany has been proven effective in integrat-
ing new stakeholders in the strategic network 
development process. The evaluation of which 
stakeholders are relevant for network expan-
sion planning could also happen within such a 
stakeholder platform. - Third, it is beneficial to specify procedures for the development of network plans. In this 
context, China could take advantage of Ger-
man experience with the network development 
planning process. Making mandatory a NDP 
for both transmission and distribution grids, 
including smart grids, helps to make net-
work expansion as efficient as possible. Clear 
scenarios about the development of RES, the 
general electricity mix, and electricity demand 
in China are needed as a basis for the defini-
tion of a network development plan in China. 
Such scenarios could then serve as a common 
basis for the network development process 
in China. Stakeholder involvement should be 
a key element of this procedure because the 
number of stakeholders is likely to increase 
in the near future due to the importance of 
non-incumbent market actors for smart grids. 
These new stakeholders should be integrated 
into the strategic network development process 
in a formal way. 
The recommended approach at a glance- A stakeholder platform on the topic of the future electricity network involving all rel-
evant market actors of the electricity sector 
(e. g. similar to the Future Oriented Energy 
Grids Platform in Germany) could help to 
evaluate which stakeholders are relevant for 
network expansion planning, support the 
network planning process, enhance mutual 
understanding among different stakehold-
ers and provide recommendations to the 
government. - Make mandatory a network development plan (NDP) for transmission and distribution 
grids, including a procedure for consulting 
the NDP with third parties and the public. 
The NDP should reflect fundamental govern-
ment policy, future energy policy goals, 
smart grid goals as well as reliability and 
security issues. The regulator should super-
vise and confirm the final NDP, which is then 
signed into law by the legislature.
5.5 Improve grid integration of RES
Chinese context- Despite the fact that China has aggressively expanded solar and wind generation capaci-
ties since 2006, their shares in the electric-
ity generation mix remain small. However, 
shares of both generation sources are 
planned to increase significantly according 
to government plans. Today, new market ac-
tors are only partly involved in the build-up 
of RES generation capacities.- Within the existing regulatory framework a lack of sufficient incentives for grid integra-
tion of RES persists even though significant 
improvements have been made in recent 
years. A considerable number of wind farms 
is only connected to the electric power grid 
with delay.
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- Often, wind farms can also not be con-nected due to the lack of a Low Voltage Ride 
Through Function. At the same time substan-
tial quantities of wind power still have to be 
curtailed in order to increase grid stability.
5.5.1 Background
New market actors require a physical connection 
to the power grid In many countries, non-incum-
bent stakeholders have been investing in RES gen-
eration capacities and contributing to the increase 
of RES in the electricity mix: project developers, 
industrial and commercial companies, prosumers, 
and even venture capital and private equity com-
panies [28]. These non-incumbent stakeholders 
need clearly defined conditions for the physical 
connection of RES installations to the power grid. 
Their RES plants need to be technically connected 
to the grid in such a manner that electricity gener-
ated from RES can be fed in. Without an equal and 
fair access, they abstain from investing in RES. As a 
result, a huge potential of capital resources for RES 
investment remains untapped.
The three elements of physical grid integration of 
RES Grid integration of RES, i. e. the issue of how 
effective, rapid, and fair the access of RES generation 
capacities to the electric power grid is organized, 
consists of three different aspects:- Grid expansion, necessary due to the connec-tion of RES, is a prerequisite for the large-scale 
integration of RES (compare ▶ Sects. 5.3 
and 5.4).- Grid connection of RES means technically interconnecting RES to the grid in such a man-
ner that electricity generated from RES can be 
fed in.- Specific grid operation issues with large amounts of RES implies assuring that the gen-
erated electricity has access to the grid so that 
it can be transported to end consumers [37].
Grid connection Important issues in many coun-
tries are so-called long lead times (e. g. delays). 
This subject groups all aspects associated with the 
time the investor of a renewable energy generation 
unit has to wait before connecting to the grid and 
feeding of electricity in the grid is allowed. Long 
lead times increase the financial risk for investors, 
creating less favorable credit conditions for them, 
and thus reducing the incentives for investments 
in RES. 
The effectiveness of grid connection is also af-
fected by how grid connection costs are distributed 
among the parties involved in the process. In this 
context, shallow or deep cost approaches can be ap-
plied:- In a deep cost approach, the RES investors requesting connection not only cover the 
costs of grid connection but also further costs 
related to grid reinforcement and extension 
beyond the connection point (i. e. deeper into 
the network). - In a shallow cost approach, the RES inves-tor only pays for grid connection costs to the 
connection point, but not for reinforcement 
and extension costs. Generally, the deep cost 
approach creates higher costs and risks for the 
RES investor. It is therefore more often viewed 
as an obstacle to RES deployment [37].
Grid operation In countries with a low share of 
intermittent RES-E in the energy mix, grid op-
eration is usually not adversely affected by RES 
installations. However, European countries like 
Germany or Denmark have made the experience 
that, with a share of approximately 10 % to 20 % of 
intermittent RES-E, grid operation becomes more 
and more difficult because regional feed-in often 
exceeds regional loads and the grids do not have 
sufficient capacities to absorb and transport the 
complete surplus of RES-E. One straight-forward 
remedy for these situations is to expand grid capaci-
ties. However, curtailing specific RES generators in 
times of peak production might be economically 
more interesting: a study suggests that curtailing 
only 2 % of the annual electricity production from 
RES (in times of peak production) could reduce 
infrastructure investments by 10 % between now 
and 2030 [26].
Grid curtailment is currently a critical issue in a 
number of European countries, especially due to the 
99 5




















lack of specific curtailment rules and compensation 
issues [37]. Clear and well-defined grid codes for the 
interconnection of RES on all grid and voltage levels 
are a decisive factor to ease grid operation with RES 
[38]. These rules define the interaction of RES and 
the electric power grid in terms of grid operation. 
This also includes the handling of congestions and 
disturbances.
The ICT-integration of RES RES integration issues 
go beyond the physical connection of RES to the 
power grid. The basic idea of smart grids is to make 
all generators and consumers of electricity monitor-
able and in part remotely controllable by means of 
ICT. Only if RES plants are remotely controllable, 
RES generation can be coordinated with grid capac-
ities at any time. In this light, the equipment of RES 
with communication interfaces is an essential part 
of smart grids. Also with respect to an economically 
efficient grid curtailment of RES, the capability of 
grid operators to monitor and control installations 
remotely is necessary.
Especially distributed RES (e. g. small rooftop 
PV installations or single wind turbines) are cur-
rently only rarely equipped with technology al-
lowing the grid operator to remotely monitor or 
control the installations. Given that owners of RES, 
especially those of small-scale RES, have usually few 
incentives in investing in communication interfaces, 
the widespread deployment and usage of such inter-
faces depends on appropriate regulatory guidance.
5.5.2 International practice
The European perspective In its Directive 2001/77/
EC2 [39], the EU laid down a common regulatory 
basis for the promotion of electricity generated from 
RES and a framework for the integration of RES into 
the grid [40]. Paragraphs 1–3 of article 7 contain 
general references to grid connection and operation 
issues demanding that EU member states
» take the necessary measures to ensure that 
transmission system operators and DSOs in their 
territory guarantee the transmission and distribu-
tion of electricity produced from renewable energy 
sources.
Also, the directive proposes priority access to the 
grid for electricity from RES and favors a cost-
sharing of grid expansion measures between grid 
operators and RES operators to pure deep cost and 
pure shallow costs approaches [39]. 
Published eight years later, Directive 2009/28/
EC3 further regulates grid connection and opera-
tion issues. In paragraphs 2–4 of article 16, the EU 
makes a clear case for priority access for electric-
ity from RES. The Directive recommends that such 
electricity be fed in with priority, that grid curtail-
ment measures for RES be minimized and justified 
by the regulator, and that grid expansion costs re-
lated to renewable energies be transparent and born 
in full or in part by the grid operators. 
Since 2009, ENTSO-E has been working on a 
network code for grid connection requirements 
which aims at
» setting out clear and objective requirements for 
generators for grid connection in order to contrib-
ute to non-discrimination, effective competition 
and the efficient functioning of the internal elec-
tricity market and to ensure system security [41]. 
The network code 
» defines a common set of requirements for power 
generation facilities, including synchronous gener-
ation units, power park modules and offshore gen-
eration facilities, to be connected to the network 
and sets up a common framework for grid connec-
tion agreements between grid operators and the 
power generation facility operators [41]. 
In defining these requirements, the network code 
clearly reduces conflicts between RES investors and 
grid operators and contributes to a better commu-
nication between them and to shorter lead times in 
RES connection as a result of more standardized 
procedures.
Grid connection of RES in Germany Part 2, chap-
ters 1–3 of the EEG contain regulations that are of 
critical importance with respect to the effectiveness 
of grid connection in Germany: - Chapter 1 section 5 emphasizes that grid operators must immediately and as a priority 
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connect all RES to the grid even if this con-
nection necessitates optimizing, boosting, or 
expanding the grid. - Paragraph 1 contains a definition of the so-called grid connection point. It is the point 
in the electricity grid which is at the nearest 
linear distance from the location of the RES 
installation. The generation capacity of the RES 
unit to be connected determines the voltage 
level of the nearest grid connection point. - The responsibility of building a connection between the RES installation and the grid con-
nection point is assigned to the grid operator. 
However, the costs for building this direct 
connection are passed on to the RES investor 
as specified in chapter 3, section 13, and para-
graph 1 of the EEG. Note that due to the rather 
close meshed electricity grids in Germany, the 
distances between the installations and the 
grid connection points are often rather short. 
Thus, connection costs to be paid by the RES 
investors are rather low in Germany.- As specified in chapter 3, section 14, however, the share of the costs within the entire electric 
power grid that is related to optimizing, boost-
ing, and expanding the grid system is allocated 
to the grid operator (shallow cost approach). 
This cost-sharing mechanism prevents the 
investors in RES projects from installing 
capacities at great distances from the existing 
power grid, as they are the ones who have to 
cover the costs for the direct line to the nearest 
connection point. - Chapter 2, section 9 specifies further that the grid operator can only be forced to optimize 
or expand the electricity grid if this is not 
economically unreasonable. 
EEG – Paragraphs 1–4 of Part 2, Chapter 1, 
Section 5- Grid system operators shall immediately and as a priority connect installations generat-
ing electricity from renewable energy sources 
and from mine gas to that point in their grid 
system (grid connection point) which is suit-
able in terms of the voltage and which is at the 
shortest linear distance from the location of 
the installation if no other grid system has a 
technically and economically more favorable 
grid connection point. […] - Installation operators shall be entitled to choose another grid connection point in this 
grid system or in another grid system which is 
suitable with regard to the voltage.- In derogation of subsections (1) and (2) above, the grid system operator shall be entitled to as-
sign the installation a different grid connection 
point. This shall not apply where the purchase 
of electricity from the installation concerned 
would not be guaranteed in accordance with 
section 8(1).- The obligation to connect the installation to the grid system shall also apply where the pur-
chase of the electricity is only made possible 
by optimizing, boosting or expanding the grid 
system in accordance with section 9.
Source: Wording from the BMUB [62]
The combination of a shallow cost approach and 
an obligation to connect RES with priority is one 
important factor with regard to grid connection in 
Germany. Another important element of the EEG 
(with regard to grid connection) is the definition of 
what happens if the grid operator fails to connect 
RES. Part 2, chapter 1, section 10 of the EEG is based 
on the notion that grid connection rules can be ef-
fective only if non-compliance of the grid operator 
leads to financial losses.
EEG – Paragraphs 1–2 of Part 2, Chapter 1, 
Section 10 - In the event that the grid system operator vio-lates his obligations under section 9(1), those 
interested in feeding in electricity may demand 
compensation for the damage incurred. The 
liability to pay compensation shall not apply if 
the grid system operator was not responsible 
for the violation of the obligation.- Where there are facts to substantiate the assumption that the grid system operator did 
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not fulfill his obligation under section 9(1), 
installation operators may require the grid 
system operator to submit information con-
cerning whether and to what extent the grid 
system operator did not meet his obligation to 
optimize, boost and expand his grid system. 
This information may be withheld if it is not 
necessary in order to establish whether the 
entitlement in accordance with subsection (1) 
above exists.
Source: Wording from the BMUB [62]
Grid operation in the presence of RES at the Ger-
man level In spite of the increasing share of elec-
tricity from wind and PV power, Germany’s electric 
power grids are still among the most secure and 
reliable grids worldwide. Germany has made the 
experience that effective grid curtailment rules are 
necessary to sustain reliability and security of sup-
ply in times of rising feed-in from RES. To allow for 
an effective grid operation in spite of the presence 
of RES, the EEG distinguishes between normal and 
critical grid conditions:5- In normal grid conditions, electricity produced in RES installations has to be fed in at any 
time – irrespective of electricity consumption. 
This is regulated in part 2, chapter 1, section 8 
of the EEG, which states that “[transmission] 
grid system operators shall immediately and 
as a priority purchase, transmit and distribute 
the entire available quantity of electricity from 
renewable energy sources”.- During critical grid conditions, however, grid operators are allowed to curtail electricity 
from RES by taking technical control over 
installations connected to their grid system. 
Part 2, chapter 2, section 6 of the EEG specifies 
that all RES plants have to be equipped with 
a communication interface allowing the grid 
operator to take over technical control over 
installations or to limit their effective capacity 
to 70 % of the installed capacity instead. Those 
RES with a capacity exceeding 100 kW have to 
5 Critical conditions occur when operational limits, accord-
ing to common technical guidelines, are violated. 
be unconditionally enhanced with a commu-
nication interface allowing the grid operator to 
remotely monitor the electricity feed-in in real 
time and to remotely control installations. To 
prevent a misuse of grid curtailment, grid op-
erators are obliged to immediately report such 
measures to the BNetzA. This grid curtailment 
of RES is not to the detriment of RES investors 
because they receive equivalent compensations 
to the extent that they incur no financial losses 
as a result of the grid curtailment (see appen-
dix E for extracts from EEG, chapter 2, part 2, 
sections 11 and 12.).
EEG – Paragraphs 1–2 of Part 2, Chapter 1, 
Section 6 - Installation operators and operators of CHP installations shall provide installations with an 
installed capacity exceeding100 kilowatts with 
technical facilities with which the grid system 
operator can, at any time:
1. reduce output by remote means in the event 
of grid overload; and
2. call up the current electricity feed-in at any 
given point in time.- Operators of installations generating electricity from solar radiation:
1. with an installed capacity between 30 kilo-
watts and 100 kilowatts shall fulfil the 
obligation pursuant to subsection (1) no. 1 
above;
2. with a maximum installed capacity of 
30 kilowatts shall:
a) fulfil the obligation pursuant to subsec-
tion (1) no. 1 above; or
b) limit the maximum effective capacity fed 
in at the grid connection point with the 
grid system to 70 percent of the installed 
capacity.
Source: Wording from the BMUB [62]
Ensuring compliance with the EEG regula-
tion Well specified laws alone might not be suffi-
cient to ensure an effective grid integration of RES 
if there is no institution with a distinct judiciary 
function to monitor compliance with the rules 
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and settle any dispute between grid operators and 
power plant owners. In this light, BMUB commis-
sioned and funded the so-called Clearingstelle EEG 
in 2007. Since then the Clearingstelle EEG serves as 
a neutral and independent institution with the in-
tention to settle any dispute between grid operators 
and power plant owners with regard to topics sur-
rounding EEG. The staff of the Clearingstelle EEG 
consists of an interdisciplinary team of lawyers and 
engineers with expertise in the field of renewable 
energies [42]. 
The general idea is that ordinary courts settle 
potential disputes rather through costly and time 
consuming litigation while the Clearingstelle EEG 
can offer alternative dispute resolution options 
such as- mediation, - joint dispute resolution, and- arbitration [42]. 
In addition, the Clearingstelle EEG reports the re-
sults of past legal disputes such that a high transpar-
ency on the jurisdiction exists among grid operators 
and plant owners. In sum, the Clearingstelle EEG 
clearly contributes to a high compliance with the 
EEG regulation in Germany.6
5.5.3 Recommended approach 
for China
The physical grid integration of RES in China cur-
rently lacks efficiency. This refers to both grid con-
nection and grid operation. Specifically, a consider-
able part of wind power is currently being curtailed. 
There is also evidence that only a very small part 
of investments are being made by non-incumbent 
players in China: investments from venture capital 
and private equity companies for example, are quite 
low compared to many other countries [28]. For the 
government’s ambitious RES expansion targets to 
be achieved and in order to incentivize new market 
actors to invest in RES, the physical grid integration 
of RES has to become more effective.
6 Further information on the work of the Clearingstelle EEG 
can be found at ▶ https://www.clearingstelle-eeg.de/
english. 
Transparency and a clear division of responsi-
bilities between grid operators and RES investors 
would encourage the deployment of RES and in-
centivize new market actors to invest in RES. The 
following recommendations are made based on best 
practices from Europe and especially Germany:- The grid operator is a monopolistic company with special responsibility. He has to define 
clear, transparent, and technically sound grid 
codes for the integration of generation units 
at all voltage levels. These codes have to be 
defined properly and made binding.- For an efficient and fast connection, grid con-nection points have to be defined properly 
for all kinds of RES on all voltage levels of the 
grid. RES need to be assigned a grid connec-
tion point on request, so that the interconnec-
tion point can be installed without delay and 
according to well-defined technical standards.- Grid operators have to bear liability for the grid connection of RES. This is very impor-
tant, because liability puts a high priority on 
the establishment of the grid connection and 
avoids delays on the grid operator’s side. In this 
context, definition of financial incentives (e. g. 
in form of penalties) is an effective measure 
to quicken the grid connection process and to 
reduce the risk for RES investors.
The same arguments which hold for the grid con-
nection are equally valid for grid operation issues. 
To ensure grid stability, it is necessary to curtail 
RES in times of critical grid conditions. To provide 
transparent procedures to the RES operators, de-
tailed processes for curtailment of RES (including 
documentation, transparency rules, timeframes, 
involved parties, etc.) have to be defined and the 
requirements for information exchange within 
these measures have to be specified. To ensure an 
economically efficient grid curtailment, the instal-
lation of communication interfaces at RES instal-
lations should be promoted by appropriate regula-
tion (such as part 2, chapter 1, section 6 of EEG 
in Germany). Moreover, it is important that grid 
curtailment of RES only takes place if this is ur-
gently needed to stabilize grid operation and that 
the compensation to the RES investor is calculated 
transparently.
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The experiences from Germany further show 
that the establishment of an independent institution 
offering mediation, joint dispute resolution, and ar-
bitration services contributes to a high compliance 
with the regulation. 
The recommended approach at a glance- Grid connection points and binding grid codes specifying respective responsibilities 
of grid operators and power generators have 
to be defined. - Grid operators have to bear liability regard-ing the grid connection of RES.- Binding procedures for curtailment of RES have to be defined. To ensure an economi-
cally efficient grid curtailment, the instal-
lation of communication interfaces at RES 
installations should be promoted by appro-
priate regulation. - An institution offering mediation, joint dis-pute resolution, and arbitration services in 
the context of grid connection issues should 
be assigned. 
5.6 Optimize the balancing 
of electricity generation 
and consumption
Chinese context- Due to the high share of industrial load, Chi-na’s overall electricity load curve is currently 
rather flat. In the future, China’s electricity 
generation might become considerably 
more fluctuating owing to the further build-
up of RES generation capacities planned by 
the government. In addition, shares of more 
intermittent residential and commercial 
electricity consumption are expected to 
increase. Both factors will lead to regionally 
higher load variability in China. - Higher load variability necessitates a more effective coordination of electricity 
generation and consumption. Specifically, 
with growing shares of intermittent RES it 
will become indispensable that electricity 
consumption will be, at least partly, able to 
follow electricity generation. This necessi-
tates the use of economic incentives as well 
as sophisticated technologies facilitating the 
coordination of electricity generation and 
consumption. All types of consumers, i. e. 
industrial, commercial, and residential, have 
to be involved in these activities.- Time-of-use pricing (i. e. electricity prices depending on the time when electricity 
is provided) aims at incentivizing electric-
ity consumers to shift their consumption 
according to generation and grid capacities. 
It has gradually been introduced in China 
to all categories of users except residential 
consumers and irrigational users. The Chi-
nese government recently announced that 
it would introduce time-of-use pricing also 
for residential consumers by the end of 2015. 
While this is certainly a step in the right 
direction, it is still questionable whether the 
present tariff system offers sufficient price 
incentives for a pronounced intraday shifting 
of power demand. 
5.6.1 Background
Peak shaving and residual peak load shaving The 
balancing of generation and consumption of elec-
tricity is of crucial importance for the stable opera-
tion of electric power systems. In a power system 
with 100 % generation from large central (bulk) 
power plants, electricity generation follows the load. 
Sometimes, peak loads may cause shortages on the 
generation side. Peak shaving, i. e. reducing the elec-
trical power consumption during periods of maxi-
mum electricity demand, is then an important fac-
tor to stabilize system operation. In power systems 
with a high share of RES, however, the motivation 
for peak shaving changes somewhat: in such power 
systems, the residual load, i. e. the difference between 
load and renewable generation, is highly volatile due 
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to the intermittent nature of renewable generation. 
In these cases, large central power plants, usually 
conventional fossil fuel-driven power plants, have 
to cover the residual load – also known as residual 
peak load shaving (or residual load balancing).
Balancing mechanisms and technologies like de-
mand side management (DSM), supply side manage-
ment (SSM), microgrids, virtual power plants (VPP), 
and energy storage can be employed to facilitate the 
coordination of electricity generation and consump-
tion. All these mechanisms and technologies require 
an ICT infrastructure for measurement, control, and 
billing of various loads and/or generation units at 
local, regional, or distributed sites.
Demand side management DSM is an important 
mechanism for peak shaving and residual peak 
shaving for different types of loads. DSM means in-
centivizing electricity consumers to adapt their con-
sumption to the availability of electricity generation. 
Principally, the loads can be influenced by means 
of two different mechanisms: on the one hand, end 
customers can react manually to suitable incen-
tives such as price signals. On the other hand, auto-
mated load control is conceivable for devices where 
deferred use and a modulated operation mode en-
tail no loss of comfort, economic consequences, or 
other restrictions in everyday household/business 
life (dispensable loads). With respect to the poten-
tial of DSM on low voltage level, the necessary IT 
infrastructure and the relation between DSM and 
AMI have been discussed widely [43].
Supply side management Supply side management 
(SSM) works similarly to DSM but refers to local 
or distributed generation facilities. SSM means in-
centivizing electricity producers to adapt their gen-
eration to the demand of electricity. The generation 
units are typically small-scale residential units like 
CHP plants or larger CHP units located at industrial 
facilities.
Virtual power plants Virtual power plants (VPP) 
aggregate power generation, storage, or consump-
tion units into one balancing unit by means of ICT 
metering and control technologies. These units may 
be spread out over the grid and belong to separate 
owners. VPP are especially useful in the context of 
electricity markets: the VPP operator controls or 
manages the operation of the generation units to 
follow a joint schedule or to offer balancing power 
to the system operators. 
Microgrids Microgrids are a specific solution to 
manage the intermittent character of RES on a re-
gional level. They are grid areas in which generation 
from local RES or other distributed generation and 
consumption is balanced by local control mecha-
nisms by means of information exchange between 
the devices through local ICT. As such, the higher-
level distribution grid to which the microgrid is 
connected is not necessarily and immediately ex-
posed to the intermittence of RES connected to the 
microgrid. Island grids without any connections to 
distribution grids are an extreme form of this ap-
proach. Note that microgrids are geographically 
connected grid regions, while VPP are virtually 
aggregated units which are distributed throughout 
larger grid areas.
Energy storage Requirements for power storage 
differ according to field of application. Some storage 
technologies are used to balance fluctuations within 
a very short timeframe (e. g. some milliseconds) and 
others are used for longer timeframes (e. g. days or 
weeks):- Hydrogen generated by means of electrolysis can be used to store electric power for time-
frames lasting up to several months.- Pumped-storage and compressed air energy storage power stations are suitable for an in-
traday balancing of generation and consump-
tion. On a global level, pumped-storage power 
plants are the most important technology to 
store electric power. - Electrochemical storage mediums like batteries are employed to store electricity for time-
frames ranging from one hour to several days. - Centrifugal mass storage, super caps, and superconductive inductors can be charged 
and unloaded within an extremely short 
timeframe. They are used for grid stabilization 
services and voltage maintenance [44].
Barriers to the development of balancing mecha-
nisms and technologies There are many different 
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barriers to the development of balancing mecha-
nisms and technologies as described above. The 
elimination of such barriers calls for suitable regu-
latory measures. In principal, these barriers can be 
classified into three different categories [45]: - Technological barriers refer to the fact that the maturity of some technologies that might be 
important for the balancing of generation and 
consumption is still rather low [46]. Electro-
chemical storage mediums such as batteries, 
for example, are in many cases still too expen-
sive to be used in a widespread manner [44].- Economic barriers exist, because for many stakeholders in the electricity sector the costs 
of investing in balancing mechanisms and 
technologies are still higher than the benefits. 
For potential investors, especially for small-
sized third parties, the administrative overhead 
and the necessary investments in ICT for 
controlling, balancing, and billing are relatively 
high. Many of them consequently refrain from 
investing in balancing technologies. Specifi-
cally, there are many open questions related to 
billing, balancing, and accounting, in the case 
that several market actors coordinate power 
generation and load for different business 
purposes.- Institutional barriers may arise if new tech-nologies have to adapt to practices and codes 
developed in a context in which these new 
technologies were not yet known. For example, 
microgrids require specific connection codes 
that are different from small conventional 
distribution grids. The costs of deploying such 
balancing mechanisms and technologies criti-
cally depend on connection codes, legal re-
porting obligations, and application processes 
[45].
5.6.2 International practice
Reducing technological barriers In order to pro-
mote the development of technologies and business 
models to balance electricity generation and con-
sumption, government-supported R&D programs 
are of fundamental importance (Germany’s R&D 
program E-Energy is presented in ▶ Sect. 4.4.6). 
Many countries have established funding schemes 
to reduce existing technological barriers:- The United States for example, claim to invest at least $3 billion into smart grid projects [47]. 
Specifically, they have funded two important 
R&D programs for microgrid and DSM dem-
onstration projects run by the United States 
Department of Defense (USDOD) and the 
United States Department of Energy (USDOE). 
The USDOD provided $38.5 million for three 
different military base microgrid demonstra-
tions, with a focus on reliability and energy 
security [45]. The USDOE spent over $50 mil-
lion for nine projects having the concrete goal 
of achieving a 15 % peak load reduction in the 
local distribution feeder [45]. - In recent years, the EU has also invested significant amounts in smart grid-related R&D 
and devoted several major research efforts ex-
clusively to DSM, SSM, VPP, microgrids, and 
energy storage. One promising example is the 
Future Internet for Smart Energy (FINSENY) 
project which was conducted as part of the 
private public partnership Future Internet from 
2010 to 2013.7 
In the United States and in Europe, the experience 
was made that two factors are especially important 
with respect to the success of R&D funding (cf. e. g. 
[45]):- Clear targets on what should be achieved by means of the research program have to be de-
fined in advance by the funding organization. 
Only if such targets exist can the success of the 
research project be measured and controlled 
during and after the project.- The recipient of R&D subsidies often has to co-finance the research program with its own 
capital. Financial participation is an impor-
tant additional incentive to ensure that the 
recipient of the subsidies will efficiently and 
effectively carry out the research project.
Reducing economic barriers All regulatory ap-
proaches aiming at decreasing investment costs in 
7 See ▶ http://www.fi-ppp-finseny.eu for more information 
on this project.
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balancing mechanisms or technologies or increasing 
profits related to their usage can be seen as an effec-
tive measure to promote their development:- A possible solution aiming at reducing invest-ment costs is to directly subsidize the usage 
of balancing mechanisms or technologies. To 
promote electricity storage, for example, the 
German government recently established a 
co-funding scheme for electric battery storages 
newly installed in private houses in combina-
tion with PV. The purpose of this measure is 
to promote local consumption of electricity 
generated by PV, thereby limiting the PV feed-
in to the distribution grid. - Time-of-use pricing is an important option to increase profits related to the usage of DSM, 
SSM, and energy storage. The higher the price 
differences between peak and base load prices, 
the higher the rate of return of DSM, SSM, and 
energy storage. - The attractiveness of microgrids critically depends on the difference of electricity genera-
tion costs within the microgrid and general 
retail prices for electricity. If a microgrid is 
able to produce its own electricity, consumers 
within the microgrid are independent from 
general electricity retail prices. However, it is 
only if general retail prices for electricity are 
higher than electricity generation costs within 
the microgrid that investments in these tech-
nologies might be potentially amortized after 
some years. In this light, increasing electricity 
retail tariffs can be seen as an important driver 
for investments in microgrids. Depending on 
the regulatory environment, microgrid opera-
tors might also be able to export the electric-
ity to the distribution grid. In this case, the 
question to be asked is whether the operators 
receive payments for the electricity they export 
and what rate these payments depend on: 
wholesale, retail, or potentially a feed-in tariff. 
Feed-in tariffs that are higher than the general 
retail price for electricity and higher than elec-
tricity generation costs inside the microgrid 
can be seen as an effective measure to promote 
the development of microgrids [48].
Reducing institutional barriers Standards for 
regulating the general grid connection of RES are 
common in most countries. Like Europe, the United 
States, for example, have a standard for grid con-
nection: IEEE 1547 was established in 2003. These 
standards often do not contain specific rules for 
VPP or microgrids. However, some countries have 
started to issue special regulation for VPP and/or 
microgrids:- To ease the grid connection of microgrids, the United States issued IEEE 1547.4: Guide 
for Design, Operation, and Integration of 
Distributed Resource Island Systems with 
Electric Power Systems. This standard presents 
alternative approaches and good practices for 
the design and operation of microgrids and 
their integration with distribution grids. For 
instance, this includes the ability to separate 
from and reconnect to the distribution grid 
while providing power to the islanded mi-
crogrid. The IEEE 1547.4 standard is currently 
gaining approval on the international level.- Another example of institutional barriers for microgrids being reduced is Germany, where 
microgrid operators have been relieved of 
several legal requirements that have applied to 
distribution grid operators in Germany since 
2005. Special rules applying to so-called site 
networks have been introduced by EnWG for 
grids covering campuses and enterprises. Such 
site networks can be designed as microgrids. 
For example, operators of site networks are not 
subject to the general connection obligation 
(§ 18 EnWG): they are permitted to publish 
less reports on grid conditions (§ 14b EnWG), 
have less monitoring obligations (§ 35 EnWG), 
and less obligations to report service disrup-
tions (§ 52 EnWG).
5.6.3 Recommended approach 
for China
The key driver for the usage of balancing mecha-
nisms and technologies in China is peak shaving 
due to the high growth rate of power consumption. 
The balancing mechanisms and technologies de-
scribed above, especially DSM and energy storage, 
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will contribute to a more effective peak shaving and 
to an improved utilization rate of the grid infra-
structure. In the long term, residual peak shaving 
– necessary due to the increasing expansion of RES 
generation capacities – will be an additional aspect 
in China. Balancing mechanisms and technologies 
like SSM, VPP, and microgrids will become more 
important in this context.
In 2011, more than 70 % of China’s electricity was 
consumed by the industrial sector [49]. In general, 
the technical potential for peak shaving in this sec-
tor is comparatively high and can be realized with 
dedicated ICT solutions. Usually, the potential for 
peak shaving is smaller and more distributed in the 
commercial sector and especially in the residential 
sector. ICT requirements and costs of implementing 
balancing mechanisms and technologies in these sec-
tors are therefore comparatively higher. In this light, 
balancing between generation and consumption in 
China should be optimized with a focus on industrial 
and commercial consumers in the short- to medium-
term and on residential consumers in the long term.
With this general background in mind, several 
specific policies may foster the development and 
usage of specific balancing mechanisms and tech-
nologies: - Time-of-use pricing to incentivize the usage of DSM and energy storage: Time-of-use pricing 
has gradually been introduced to all catego-
ries of users except residential consumers and 
irrigational users. With regard to commercial 
and industrial consumers, China already has 
a very high time-of-use adoption rate, with 
roughly two thirds of large-scale customers 
using time-based electricity tariffs [50]. Even 
if the difference between peak and off-peak 
prices has increased in recent times, it is still 
questionable whether the current tariff system 
offers sufficient incentives for a pronounced 
intraday shifting of power demand [51]. The 
Chinese government recently announced that 
it would also introduce time-of-use pricing for 
residential consumers by the end of 2015 [50]. 
In designing this new tariff system, sufficient 
differences between peak and off-peak prices 
have to be considered as a key success factor. 
The same key success factor applies to time-of-
use pricing in non-residential sectors. 
- Additional R&D funds for SSM, VPP, microgrid, and energy storage demonstration projects: 
To help abolish technological barriers, the 
Chinese government has decided to promote 
the development of different balancing mecha-
nisms and technologies and it has already 
started to foster R&D in these areas. From an 
institutional point of view, the NEA has played 
the most active role in promoting balancing 
mechanisms [45]. Other institutions that are 
interested in the promotion of such technolo-
gies are the NDRC, the Ministry of Housing 
and Urban Rural Development, and the MOF 
[45]. However, the pertinent research has just 
started in China and consequently needs to 
be intensified in the future to catch up with 
international best practice technologies. Thus, 
additional R&D funds should be set up for 
SSM, VPP, microgrid, or energy storage dem-
onstration projects. In this context, it is specifi-
cally important to set up concrete performance 
targets for funded demonstration projects and 
require a co-financing of the subsidies’ recipi-
ents.- Feed-in tariffs and interconnection standards for microgrids: compared to European coun-
tries and many other countries, retail prices for 
electricity are very low in China. As a conse-
quence, prices for locally generated electricity 
(e. g. in microgrids) are often significantly 
higher than local retail prices for electricity. 
This has already led individual investors to 
abandon microgrids demonstration projects 
[46]. However, increasing electricity retail 
prices to promote the development of mi-
crogrids would directly contrast one of China’s 
primary energy policy goals: affordable retail 
prices. Therefore, feed-in tariffs for local RES 
or microgrids could be an option to incentiv-
ize investments in microgrids. Also, intercon-
nection standards for microgrids (such as 
IEEE 1547.4), currently not existing in China, 
should be issued and made legally binding.
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The recommended approach at a glance- Coordination between generation and con-sumption should be optimized with a focus 
on industrial and commercial consumers in 
the short- to medium-term and on residen-
tial consumers in the long term. - Peak shaving is of crucial importance in the short to medium term. To promote peak 
shaving, it is specifically recommended to 
refine time-of-use pricing in China in order 
to set sufficient incentives (by means of 
high differences between peak and off-peak 
prices) for investments in DSM and energy 
storage for all categories of consumers.- Residual peak shaving is relevant in the long term. Additional R&D funds for SSM, VPP, 
and microgrids as well as interconnection 
standards and feed-in tariffs specifically 
for microgrids can be employed to reduce 
technological, economic, and institutional 
barriers to the development of SSM, VPP, and 
microgrids. 
5.7 Facilitate the development 
of a unified view of smart grids
Chinese context- Due to the different strategies of China’s grid operators with regard to smart grid develop-
ment and the fact that the Chinese govern-
ment has not yet publicly defined its view 
on smart grids, there is still no unanimously 
accepted vision on the technological and or-
ganizational design of smart grids in China. 
As a result, there is much uncertainty among 
potential smart grid investors regarding the 
future development. - The diversity of stakeholders interested in standardization in China has increased 
in recent years: in addition to the central 
government, research institutes, universi-
ties, civilian and defense industries, and 
regional governments, all have their own 
interests with regard to standardization and 
are increasingly willing to contribute to the 
standardization process [63].
5.7.1 Background
Smart grids require a common understanding 
of all stakeholders Smart grids represent a con-
cept aiming at the integration of information and 
communication among market actors from various 
sectors as well as a multitude of power system com-
ponents. In a smart grid, data on the grid status is 
exchanged as well as data related to services, prod-
ucts, and reporting obligations. A key challenge of 
smart grids is to integrate its different components 
and ensure that they can communicate with the help 
of ICT. The definition of common standards for in-
terfaces and communication protocols is therefore 
of utmost importance in order to ensure interoper-
ability and a smooth exchange of information be-
tween the different elements of a smart grid. The 
costs of connecting smart grid technologies through 
ICT (integration costs) significantly affect the over-
all costs of deploying smart grid technologies and 
are thus one key success factor for smart grids. A 
prerequisite for reducing integration costs is a uni-
fied view on smart grid technologies, business pro-
cesses, and procedures. Furthermore, smart grid-
related technologies, products, and services can only 
be developed by the variety of stakeholders in a cost-
efficient manner if requirements for smart grid solu-
tions are accepted by all smart grid stakeholders.
Standardization as a means to create a common 
understanding Standardization can serve to cre-
ate a common understanding between participating 
stakeholders, thus increasing interoperability, and 
reducing smart grid integration costs. According 
to the German Institute for Standardization (DIN), 
standardization usually has at least five major goals:- securing the competiveness of domestic industries in the international context of a 
broad ensemble of diverging technologies and 
procedures,
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- providing a strategic instrument to foster eco-nomic and social success,- supporting and relieving government regula-tion,- fostering technological convergence, and- creating efficient processes and instruments [52].
These goals illustrate that the current scope of stan-
dardization goes well beyond the integration of two 
or more individual systems. The following aspects 
should be focused on in the context of smart grid-
related standardization issues:- How can the development of standards sup-port the common understanding of future 
smart grids?- How can the process of national and interna-tional standardization be optimized for faster 
time to markets of necessary standards?- How can the heterogeneous requirements and viewpoints of different stakeholders with 
regard to smart grid architecture be expressed?
The government’s role in promoting standardiza-
tion In some cases, governments are quite actively 
involved in standardization processes. By issuing 
laws and regulations providing minimum standards 
for certain goods, services, or technologies, govern-
ments are even able to legally enforce standards. In 
many cases, however, standardization is mainly 
pushed forward by the private industry in coopera-
tion with accredited standards developing organiza-
tions (SDO).8 Note that, due to the involvement of 
many different stakeholders in SDO, a high level of 
coordination between the various stakeholders is 
necessary.
Even if standardization is left to the private sec-
tor, many governments acknowledge its importance 
in today’s quickly developing technological envi-
ronment. In 2009, for instance, the German govern-
ment issued a Standardization Policy Concept of the 
Federal Government [53]. This policy paper presents 
the goals and expectations of the government with 
regard to standardization as well as specific measures 
8 Especially in those areas where potential harm to citizens 
resulting from non-compliance with the standard is low, 
standardization is mainly left to private industry [64].
of different ministries. In general, governments have 
many options to influence standardization, and con-
sequently they play an important role in this context. 
To give just a few examples, possible governmental 
measures to promote standardization are:- hosting conferences and symposia on stan-dardization issues,- strengthening the role and (financial) power of SDO,- actively participating in the work of SDO, and- considering standardization issues in the edu-cational system [53].
5.7.2 International practice
European Mandate M/490 The EU specifically 
acknowledges the importance of standardization 
in smart grids: the European Commission issued 
the European Mandate M/490 with the intention 
to promote the development of a unified and com-
monly accepted view on smart grids to increase in-
teroperability and reduce integration costs. To ex-
ecute Mandate M/490, the Smart Grid Coordination 
Group (SG-CG) was founded by the major European 
standardization organizations European Committee 
for Standardization (CEN), European Committee 
for Electrotechnical Organization (CENELEC), and 
European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
(ETSI). All of them are mirror-organizations of the 
main international standardization organizations In-
ternational Organization for Standardization (ISO), 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), and 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU). 
Scope and objective of Mandate M/490
“The challenge of Smart Grids deployment will 
require changes to existing standards, industry 
rules and processes.
This mandate is to address such a challenge in the 
field of standardization. The expected long term 
duration of Smart Grid deployment suggests the 
need for a framework that is:- Comprehensive and integrated enough to embrace the whole variety of Smart Grid actors 
and ensure communications between them
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- In-depth enough to guarantee interoper-ability of Smart Grids from basic connectivity 
to complex distributed business applications, 
including a unified set of definitions so that all 
Members States have a common understand-
ing of the various components of the Smart 
Grid.- Flexible and fast enough to take advantage of the existing telecommunications infrastructure 
and services as well as the emergence of new 
technologies while enhancing competitiveness 
of the markets.- Flexible enough to accommodate some differ-ences between EU Member States approaches 
to Smart Grids deployment […].
The expected framework will consist of the follow-
ing deliverables:- A technical reference architecture, which will represent the functional information data 
flows between the main domains and inte-
grate many systems and subsystems architec-
tures.- A set of consistent standards, which will support the information exchange (commu-
nication protocols and data models) and the 
integration of all users into the electric system 
operation.
- Sustainable standardization processes and collaborative tools to enable stakeholder 
interactions, to improve the two above and 
adapt them to new requirements based on gap 
analysis, while ensuring the fit to high level 
system constraints such as interoperability, 
security, and privacy, etc.”
Source: Wording from the European Commis-
sion [65]
Organizational aspects of Mandate M/490 The 
SG-CG consists of four working groups that are 
synchronized with those of mandates M/441 (smart 
metering) and M/468 (electric mobility). The fol-
lowing four working groups are organized under a 
joint steering committee (see . Fig. 5.3):- First Set of Standards (WG FSS): Responsible for compiling a consistent set of smart grid 
standards based on existing standards by ap-
plying the concepts and processes from the 
other working groups.- Reference Architecture (WG RA): Responsible for the design of a technical reference archi-
tecture to be used in the other groups in order 
to consistently and comprehensively describe 
smart grids. The technical reference architec-
ture can be thought of as a map showing the 
 . Fig. 5.3 Organizational structure of M/490 SG-CG, taken from [55]
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boundaries as well as different areas of smart 
grids. It can be used to increase the under-
standing of who does what with whom in 
which manner in smart grids.- Sustainable Processes (WG SP): Responsible for the design of processes for the identifica-
tion and application of smart grid use cases. 
In the smart grid context, use cases describe 
specific smart grid applications and define 
the important actors, systems and technolo-
gies and their requirements and functions 
contributing to the development of a common 
understanding of smart grids [54]. Use cases 
are neutral with regard to specific projects, 
products, and vendors and can also be applied 
within a gap analysis revealing the need for 
future smart grid standardization. 
- Smart Grid Information Security (WG SGIS): Responsible for identifying the guidelines to 
achieve information security and privacy in 
the context of the application of current smart 
grid standards.
Main results of European Mandate M/490 As it 
provides the structure referenced in the results of 
the other SG-CG working groups, the so-called 
Smart Grid Architecture Model (SGAM), a techni-
cal reference architecture developed within WG 
RA, can be described as the first deliverable of the 
Mandate M/490. SGAM (see . Fig. 5.4) is a three-
dimensional model of the European smart grid 
environment. It distinguishes between physical do-
mains (generation, transmission, distribution, dis-
tributed energy resources, and customer premises), 
 . Fig. 5.4 SGAM – The Smart Grid Architecture Model, taken from [56]  
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management zones (process, field, station, opera-
tion, enterprise, and market) and interoperability 
dimensions (component, communication, informa-
tion, function, business).
The different interoperability dimensions are 
based on the GridWise Architecture Council’s (GWAC) 
Inter-operability Context-Setting Framework [57]: the 
component layer represents the physical/technical 
aspect of the system and is therefore used to model 
physical equipment and infrastructure. The commu-
nication layer further specifies protocols and proce-
dures of data exchanges between the components, 
while the information layer outlines the information 
models used in the context of the components and 
information exchange. Above these solution-oriented 
dimensions, the function layer specifies the logical 
and thus technology-independent viewpoint in terms 
of the functions and services realized by the imple-
mentation, while the business layer finally represents 
the objectives as well as regulatory and legal require-
ments connected to these functions.
WG SP applied the SGAM to identify smart 
grid use cases. The use case methodology is widely 
based on the Publicly Available Specification (PAS) 
IEC 62559 and includes a template for the unified 
description of use cases as well as a process to iden-
tify and manage use cases (subject to standardiza-
tion as IEC 62559). WG FSS compiled a smart grid 
standards list based on SGAM and the smart grid 
use cases. The list structures the multitude of stan-
dards within a common framework reducing the 
complexity of the standardization landscape. Us-
ers of the list may search for appropriate smart grid 
standards based on their classification by domains, 
zones and layers (see appendix F for further infor-
mation on the work of WG SP and WG SGIS as well 
as the next steps of Mandate M/490). 
5.7.3 Recommended approach 
for China
The diversity of stakeholders interested in standard-
ization issues in China has generally increased in re-
cent years. The trend towards RES and more actively 
involved end consumers of electric power addition-
ally tends to increase the number of stakeholders 
engaged in smart grid standardization. In particular, 
new market actors such as the ICT industry are ex-
pected to participate actively in order to unfold their 
innovative potential.
Examples for current standardization 
activities in China and possible 
connections to the European Mandate 
M/490
The SGCC Framework and Roadmap for Strong & 
Smart Grid Standards [66] stresses the impor-
tance of standardization for the smart grid 
development. Analyzing this document reveals 
the intention to identify gaps and thereby sup-
port the planning and implementation process. 
The mechanisms and concepts proposed in the 
context of the Mandate M/490 are appropriate 
to be taken into consideration for the stan-
dardization in China and the coordination and 
harmonization of activities on the international 
level.
The issues and aims discussed in the context 
of the standardization process in China may 
benefit from coordination with similar activities 
in the international context. Within the organi-
zational structure of the M/490 SG-CG, possible 
liaisons with standardization activities in other 
countries including China are mentioned as fu-
ture tasks within the scope of Mandate M/490. 
Therefore a joint discussion on the issues of 
smart grid standardization may support the 
design of the smart grid architecture based on a 
unified planning process and a set of consistent 
standards.
As the goal of a consistent standardization 
framework is expressed in context of the SGCC 
Framework and Roadmap for Strong & Smart 
Grid Standards, its structure regarding the 
standardization system in China may represent 
a suitable starting point to integrate the Euro-
pean and Chinese viewpoints in context of a 
common framework. Furthermore, the national 
smart grid standardization task force estab-
lished by the Standardization Administration 
of China (SAC) and NEA about two years ago 
may also be considered as an organizational 
platform to address these issues. 
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The further promotion of smart grid standardiza-
tion activities would accelerate the development 
of an unanimously accepted vision on the techno-
logical and organizational design of smart grids in 
China. Specifically, the integration of new market 
actors in the standardization process would in-
crease the innovation potential in the smart grid 
development. Based on the activities of the Euro-
pean Commission, the following policies are worth 
considering:- The establishment of an organizational ar-rangement for smart grid standardization: the 
Chinese government, for example via MOST, 
could promote the foundation of an organiza-
tional arrangement such as SG-CG to coordi-
nate standardization issues and integrate new 
market actors in the standardization process. 
Within this organizational arrangement, clear 
structures and processes to foster the under-
standing of the smart grid concept and to 
provide the means to model and implement 
smart grid solutions should be defined and 
implemented. The requirements of smart grids 
should be analyzed and current and future 
stakeholders identified. - The commissioning of a reference architecture framework: the government could engage this 
organizational arrangement to develop archi-
tectural concepts such as a technical reference 
architecture (i. e. a Chinese Smart Grid Ar-
chitecture Model). The models applied in this 
context should be able to describe interoper-
ability aspects of the systems, ranging from 
business objectives to technical connectivity of 
the components involved in a solution.- The commissioning of smart grid use cases and standards: use case descriptions and a 
thorough process to address governance and 
quality aspects are beneficial to develop a set 
of consistent and complimentary smart grid 
standards. The work of the SG-CG may be 
regarded as a reference in this area. Moreover, 
adapting the results of SG-CG to the Chinese 
context or creating a compatible (mirror-like) 
approach could serve as the basis to initiate 
a joint discussion on the issues of smart grid 
standardization. 
Following these recommendations, the key quality 
requirements of interoperability, data management, 
and cyber security can then be thoroughly analyzed 
and managed to create appropriate architecture 
models and identify supporting smart grid stan-
dards. This way, Chinese standardization processes 
could be synchronized more with international 
standardization. For example, Chinese standards 
could be promoted to the international level. Cur-
rently, the joint work in standardizing information 
exchange for demand response and in connecting 
demand side equipment and/or systems into the 
smart grid (in IEC PC 118) is a good example for 
the benefits of such cooperation. 
The recommended approach at a glance- Promote the establishment of an organiza-tional arrangement (e. g. similar to SG-CG) to 
coordinate smart grid standardization. - Initiate the development of a reference architecture framework taking into account 
technical and organizational aspects which 
are unique to China (i. e. a Chinese Smart 
Grid Architecture Model). - Ensure that effective and efficient standard-ization processes exist and promote the 
development of smart grid use cases and 
standards. 
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